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Abstract—In this work, we consider the resilience of dis-
tributed algorithms based on stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
in distributed learning with potentially Byzantine attackers,
who could send arbitrary information to the parameter server
to disrupt the training process. Toward this end, we propose
a new Lipschitz-inspired coordinate-wise median approach
(LICM-SGD) to mitigate Byzantine attacks. We show that our
LICM-SGD algorithm can resist up to half of the workers
being Byzantine attackers, while still converging almost surely
to a stationary region in non-convex settings. Also, our LICM-
SGD method does not require any information about the
number of attackers and the Lipschitz constant, which makes it
attractive for practical implementations. Moreover, our LICM-
SGD method enjoys the optimal O(md) computational time-
complexity in the sense that the time-complexity is the same
as that of the standard SGD under no attacks. We conduct
extensive experiments to show that our LICM-SGD algorithm
consistently outperforms existing methods in training multi-
class logistic regression and convolutional neural networks with
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. In our experiments, LICM-
SGD also achieves a much faster running time thanks to its
low computational time-complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Fueled by the rise of machine learning and big data
analytics, recent years have witnessed an ever-increasing
interest in solving large-scale empirical risk minimization
problems (ERM) – a fundamental optimization problem that
underpins a wide range of machine learning applications. In
the post-Moore’s-Law era, however, to sustain the rapidly
growing computational power needs for solving large-scale
ERM, the only viable solution is to exploit parallelism at
and across different spatial scales. Indeed, the recent success
of machine learning applications is due in large part to
the use of distributed machine learning frameworks (e.g.,
TensorFlow [1] and others) which exploit the abundance
of distributed CPU/GPU resources in large-scale computing
clusters. Furthermore, in many large-scale learning systems,
data are sampled and stored at different geo-locations. As
a result, it is often infeasible to move all the data to a
centralized location because of prohibitively high costs or
privacy concerns. Due to these factors, first-order stochas-
tic gradient descent (SGD) based methods have been the
workhorse algorithms in most distributed machine learning
frameworks thanks to their low complexity and simplicity
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in distributed implementations. Unfortunately, the prolifer-
ation of distributed learning systems also introduces many
new cybersecurity challenges in the design of SGD-based
distributed optimization algorithms. Besides the conventional
computation/communication errors or stalled processes seen
in traditional distributed computing systems, a serious prob-
lem in SGD-based distributed optimization methods is that
they are prone to the so-called Byzantine attacks, where
a malicious worker machine returns arbitrary information
to the parameter server. It has been shown in [2] that,
under Byzantine attacks, even a single erroneous gradient
can fail the whole learning system and causing the classical
distributed SGD algorithm to diverge. In light of the vulnera-
bility of the traditional SGD-based optimization algorithms,
there have been strong interests in designing robust SGD-
type algorithms that are resilient to Byzantine attacks in
distributed learning. However, developing Byzantine-resilient
optimization algorithms for distributed learning is highly
non-trivial. Despite a significant amount of efforts spent over
the years, most existing work in the literature on Byzantine-
resilient distributed algorithms (see, e.g., [2]–[8]) have two
main limitations: i) requiring the knowledge of the number
of malicious workers, which is often infeasible in practice;
and ii) suffering from high computational complexity in
stochastic subgradient screening and aggregation mecha-
nisms (see Section II for detailed discussions). Moreover,
the classification accuracy performance of these existing
works are far from satisfactory in practice (see our numerical
experiments in Section V). The limitations of these existing
works motivate us to develop a new Byzantine-resilient SGD-
based optimization algorithm for distributed learning.
The main contribution of this paper is that we propose a
new Byzantine-resilient SGD-based optimization algorithm
based on a low-complexity Lipschitz-inspired coordinate-
wise median approach (LICM-SGD), which overcomes the
aforementioned limitations in mitigating Byzantine attacks.
Our main technical results are summarized as follows:
• Inspired by the rationale that “benign workers should
generate stochastic gradients closely following the Lip-
schitz characteristics of the true gradients,” we develop
a Lipschitz-inspired coordinate-wise stochastic gradient
screening and aggregation mechanism. We show that our
proposed LICM-SGD can resist up to one-half of the
workers being Byzantine, and yet still achieve the same
convergence performance compared to the no-attack sce-
nario. We note that these nice performance gains under
LICM-SGD are achieved without requiring any knowledge
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of the number of Byzantine attackers, which is assumed in
most existing works (see, e.g., [2]–[4], [6]–[9]). Hence, our
proposed LICM-SGD is more advantageous for practical
implementations.
• Another salient feature of our proposed LICM-SGD ap-
proach is that it has low computational complexity in
stochastic gradient screening and aggregation. Specifi-
cally, our LICM-SGD method only requires O(md) time-
complexity, where m is the number of worker machines
and d is the dimensionality of the ERM problem. We note
that this time-complexity is optimal in the sense that it
is the same as the most basic distributed SGD algorithm,
which has the lowest computational time-complexity. In
contrast, most of the existing algorithms with Byzantine-
resilience performance similar to ours (i.e., being able to
resist up to one half of workers being Byzantine) have
time complexity O(m2d), which is problematic in data
centers where the number of workers is typically large.
• Last but not least, to verify the real-world performance
of our proposed LICM-SGD approach, we conduct exten-
sive experiments by training multi-class regression (MLR)
and convolutional neural networks (CNN) based on the
MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets. Our experimental results
show that the classification accuracy under LICM-SGD is
only 5% lower than the standard distributed SGD method
with no attacks, and consistently outperforms the state of
the art in the literature. For MLR and CNN training on
the MNIST datasets, LICM-SGD can reach up to 85%
classification accuracy, which is three times as high as
other coordinate-wise median-based methods. These good
numerical results corroborate our theoretical results.
Collectively, our results advance the design of Byzantine-
resilient SGD-type optimization algorithms for distributed
machine learning. The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows: In Section II, we review the literature to put
our work in comparative perspectives. Section III introduces
the system and problem formulation. Section IV focuses
on the LICM-SGD algorithmic design and performance
analysis. Section V presents numerical results and Section VI
concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Generally speaking, the basic idea behind most Byzantine-
resilient SGD methods is to take the median of a batch of
stochastic gradients, which is statistically more stable than
taking the average as in the basic SGD method. Under this
basic idea, existing works can be roughly classified into two
main categories as follows.
The first category is based on the geometric median.
Specifically, this approach aims to find a point in the pa-
rameter vector space that minimizes the sum distance to the
current batch of stochastic gradients in some `p norm sense.
Two notable approaches in this category are [5] and [2],
both of which can be shown to converge with up to half of
the workers being Byzantine. We note that these methods
have the same Byzantine resilience performance compared
to ours. However, the computational complexity of these
approaches is O(m2d), where m is the number of workers
and d is the dimensionality of the problem. We note that
this computational complexity is significantly higher than
our O(md) result and could be problematic in data center
settings, where the number of machines is on the order of
thousands or even higher. Further, it has been recently shown
that Byzantine attackers can utilize the high dimensionality
and the highly non-convex landscape of the loss function in
ERM to make geometric-median-based methods ineffective
[4]. The reason is that since geometric median minimizes
the sum distance of all dimensions, it may not be able to
discriminate how much two stochastic gradients disagree in
each dimension. To address this problem, the authors of [4]
proposed a hybrid strategy: the first step is to recursively use
a geometric-median-based method to pick m− 2q gradients,
and then utilize a coordinate-wise trimmed mean approach
(to be discussed shortly) to determine the update direc-
tion. However, their computational time-complexity remains
O(m2d) and the maximum number of Byzantine attackers
cannot exceed 1/4 of total workers.
The second category is based on using the coordinate-
wise median (or related methods) as an aggregation rule for
the stochastic gradient updates. Specifically, coordinate-wise
median methods simply take the median in each dimen-
sion rather than the entire vector as in geometric median.
For example, in [3], the authors gave a sharp analysis
on the statistical error rates for two Byzantine-resilient
algorithms, namely coordinate-wise median and trimmed
mean, respectively. The convergence of these existing co-
ordinate median based methods can tolerate up to half of
the workers being Byzantine, and with computational time-
complexity O(md) (same as ours). However, in practice, the
classification accuracy performance of these coordinate-wise
median based methods are usually worse than those of the
geometric median based methods. We note that our LICM-
SGD method also falls into the category of coordinate-wise
median methods. However, our work differs from the existing
coordinate median approaches in that we develop a Lipschitz-
inspired selection rule for screening stochastic gradients.
Our LICM-SGD method not only retains the low O(md)
time-complexity, but also achieves a classification accuracy
significantly higher than the existing work.
We note that there are other related works that consider
different settings under Byzantine attacks, which are not
directly comparable to our work algorithmically. For exam-
ple, the authors in [9] considered asynchronous SGD, while
the authors in [10] used historical information to remove
suspicious workers from future considerations. In [11], the
authors proposed to let the parameter server keep a small set
of data to compute an estimate of the true gradient, which is
used as a benchmark to filter out suspicious gradients. In [7],
the authors developed a suspicion-based aggregation rule, but
with a weaker attack model that the Byzantine attackers have
no information about the loss function.
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Fig. 1. A distributed learning system with Byzantine attacks.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Notation: In this paper, we use boldface to denote
matrices/vectors. We let [v]i represent the i-th entry of v.
We use ‖·‖ to denote the `2-norm.
In this paper, we consider a distributed machine learning
system with potential adversarial attacks. As shown in Fig. 1,
there are one parameter server (PS) and m distributed worker
machines in the system. Some of the workers could be
malicious and launch Byzantine attacks. We consider a
standard empirical risk minimization (ERM) setting, where
the goal is to find an optimal parameter vector w∗ that
minimizes the risk function F (w), i.e.,
w∗ = arg min
w∈Rd
F (w) , 1
N
N∑
j=1
f(w, ξj),
where f : Rd → R represents a loss function of some learn-
ing models (e.g., regression, deep neural networks, etc.) and
{ξj}Nj=1 denotes the set of random samples with size N . In
this system, the PS and workers employ a stochastic gradient
descent (SGD) based optimization algorithm to solve the
ERM problem in a distributed fashion as follows: In iteration
k, each worker i first retrieves the current parameter value wk
from the PS. It then draws a mini-batch of independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random data samples from its
local database to compute a stochastic gradient gi(wk) ∈ Rd
of the loss function and return gi(wk) to the PS. Upon the
reception of all m stochastic gradients from the workers, the
PS updates the parameter vector as follows:
wk+1 = wk − ηkG[gi(wk), . . . , gm(wk)], (1)
where ηk is the step-size in iteration k and G[·] denotes some
aggregation rule. As an example, for the standard SGD in
normal systems without attacks, G corresponds to taking the
average of the stochastic gradients.
In Byzantine attacks, malicious workers have the full
knowledge of the system and they can collaborate with
each other. Each Byzantine worker could return arbitrary
values to the PS. Hence, the Byzantine attack model is
viewed as the most difficult class of attacks to defend in
distributed systems. In this paper, we aim to develop a robust
aggregation function G(·) (instead of taking the average) to
mitigate Byzantine attacks. Toward this end, we make the
following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Unbiased Gradient Estimator): The stoc-
hastic gradient gi(wk) returned by a correct (non-Byzantine)
worker i is an unbiased estimator of the true gradient of F (·)
evaluated at wk, i.e., Egi(wk) = ∇F (wk), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Assumption 2 (Bounded Variance): The stochastic gradi-
ent gi(wk) from a correct (non-Byzantine) worker i ∈
{1, . . . ,m} has a bounded variance, i.e., E∣∣[gi(wk)]j −
[∇F (wk)]j
∣∣2≤σ2, ∀j=1, . . . , d, where σ2>0 is a constant.
Assumption 3 (Lipschitz Continuous Gradient): There
exists a constant L > 0 such that for all w1,w2 ∈ Rd, it
holds that ‖∇F (w1)−∇F (w2)‖ ≤ L‖w1 −w2‖.
Assumption 4 (Step-size): The step-sizes {ηk} in (1) sat-
isfy
∑∞
k=1 ηk =∞ and
∑∞
k=1 η
2
k <∞.
Assumption 5 (Differentiability): The objective function
F (·) is three times differentiable with continuous derivatives.
Assumption 6 (Linear Growth of the r-th Moment): For
a stochastic gradient gi(wk) returned by a correct (non-
Byzantine) worker i, there exist positive constants Cr, Dr >
0, r = 2, 3, 4, such that E‖gi(wk)‖r ≤ Cr +
Dr‖wk‖r,∀wk ∈ Rd.
Several remarks for Assumptions 1–6 are in order: As-
sumptions 1–4 are standard in the SGD convergence analysis
literature. Assumption 5 can usually be satisfied by most
learning problems in practice. Assumption 6 implies that the
r-th moment of a non-Byzantine stochastic gradient does
not grow faster than linearly with respect to the norm of
wk, which is a necessary condition in order to bound the
distribution tails for convergence (cf. [12]). We note that
Assumption 6 is not restrictive and has appeared in non-
convex stochastic approximations (e.g., [12]) as well as
several recent Byzantine tolerant gradient descent algorithms
[2] [9]. Note that we do not assume any convexity property
about F (·), i.e., F (·) could potentially be non-convex.
With the above modeling and assumptions, we are now in
a position to present our Byzantine-resilient SGD method,
which constitutes the main subject in the next section.
IV. A LIPSCHITZ-INSPIRED COORDINATE-WISE MEDIAN
APPROACH TO MITIGATE BYZANTINE ATTACKS
In this section, we will first introduce our LICM-SGD
algorithm in Section IV-A. Then, we will present the main
theoretical results and their intuitions in Section IV-B. The
proofs for the main results are provided in Section VII-B.
A. The LICM-SGD Algorithm
Before presenting our LICM-SGD algorithm, we first
formally define the notion of coordinate-wise median, which
serves as a key building block for our aggregation rule.
Definition 1 (Coordinate-wise Median): For a set of vec-
tors vi ∈ Rd, i = 1, . . . ,m, the coordinate-wise median,
denoted as CoorMed{vi, i = 1, . . . ,m}, is a vector with its j-
th coordinate being Med{[vi]j , i = 1, . . . ,m}, j = 1, . . . , d,
where Med{·} denotes the median of a set of scalars.
Our proposed LICM-SGD algorithm is stated in Algo-
rithm 1 as follows:
Algorithm 1: The LICM-SGD Algorithm.
Initialization:
1. Let k = 0. Choose an initial parameter vector w0 and
an initial step-size η0.
Main Loop:
2. In the k-th iteration, each worker i retrieves the current
parameter vector wk from the PS, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m.
3. For each worker i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, if it is non-Byzantine,
it computes a stochastic gradient gi(wk) based on a
mini-batch and returns gi(wk) to the PS; otherwise, it
returns an arbitrary value to the PS.
4. Upon receiving stochastic gradients from all m work-
ers, the PS computes the coordinate-wise median uk:
uk = CoorMed{gi(wk), i = 1, . . . ,m}. (2)
Then, the PS selects all stochastic gradient vectors
gi(wk), i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, that satisfy:∣∣[gi(wk)]j−[uk−1]j∣∣≤γ∣∣[uk]j−[uk−1]j∣∣, (3)
∀j ∈ {1, . . . , d}, to form a set T ∗k , where γ ≥ 1 is
some system parameter. If k = 0, let g˜(w0) = u0.
Otherwise, let
g˜(wk) =
1
|T ∗k |
∑
i∈T ∗k
gi(wk). (4)
5. Update the parameter vector as:
wk+1 = wk − ηkg˜(wk). (5)
6. Let k ← k + 1 and go to Step 2.
Remark 1: Several important remarks on Algorithm 1 are
in order: i) Algorithm 1 is inspired by the intuition that
“benign workers should generate stochastic gradients closely
following the Lipschitz characteristics of the true gradients.”
To see this, note that if the CoorMed{·} operation removes
the outliers and so uk is “close” to the average (i.e., an
unbiased estimator of ∇F (·)), then we approximately have:∣∣[uk]j − [uk−1]j∣∣∣∣[wk]j − [wk−1]j∣∣ ≈
∣∣[∇F (wk)]j − [∇F (wk−1)]j∣∣∣∣[wk]j − [wk−1]j∣∣ ≤ L,
where the last inequality follows from the Lipschitz gradi-
ent assumption (cf. Assumption 3). Hence, if a stochastic
gradient gi(wk) satisfies the following relationship:
|[gi(wk)]j − [uk−1]j |
|[wk]j − [wk−1]j | ≤
γ|[uk]j − [uk−1]j |
|[wk]j − [wk−1]j |
≈ γ|[∇F (wk)]j − [∇F (wk−1)]j ||[wk]j − [wk−1]j | / γL, ∀j, (6)
for some appropriately chosen parameter γ ≥ 1, then it is
likely that worker i is a benign worker. Lastly, extracting the
numerator relationship from (6) yields:∣∣[gi(wk)]j − [uk−1]j∣∣ ≤ γ∣∣[uk]j − [uk−1]j∣∣,
which is the stochastic gradient selection rule (3) in Algo-
rithm 1. It is also worth pointing out that even though Eq. (3)
is inspired by the Lipschitz characteristics of ∇F (·), we do
not need to know the value of the Lipschitz constant L. ii)
The parameter γ ≥ 1 is used to balance the trade-off between
Byzantine-resilience and variance. This is because, on one
hand, increasing γ helps increase the size of T ∗k , leading
to smaller variance (if all included stochastic gradients are
benign) but at a higher risk to include Byzantine workers.
On the other hand, decreasing γ could lead to too few
stochastic gradients being eligible, which results in a larger
variance in the final stochastic gradient computation (4). In
practical implementations, γ can either be preset or data-
driven (i.e., adaptively choosing γ based on the sequentially
arriving random samples). iii) We note that, unlike most
existing methods in the literature, Algorithm 1 does not
require the knowledge of the number of Byzantine workers,
which is usually difficult to estimate in practice. Hence,
our proposed LICM-SGD method is more advantageous for
practical implementations.
B. Main Theoretical Results
For better readability, we summarize the main theoretical
results in this subsection and relegate their proofs to Sec-
tion VII-B. Our first key result in this paper suggests that the
coordinate-wise median of a set of stochastic gradients under
Byzantine attacks shares the same statistical characteristics
as that of a non-Byzantine stochastic gradient if the number
of Byzantine workers is less than half of the total.
Lemma 1 (Statistical Properties of CoorMed(·)): Let q
be the number of Byzantine workers and if 2q + 1 < m,
then uk = CoorMed{gi(wk), i = 1, . . . ,m} share the same
statistical characteristics as a stochastic gradient returned by
a non-Byzantine worker:
E
∣∣[uk]j − [∇F (wk)]j∣∣2 ≤ σ2, j = 1, . . . , d,
E‖uk‖r ≤ Cr +Dr‖wk‖r, ∀wk ∈ Rd, r = 2, 3, 4.
Lemma 1 indicates that, statistically, uk can be viewed as a
non-Byzantine stochastic gradient if 2q+1 < m. This insight
is our fundamental rationale to use uk as a benchmark for
our aggregation criterion in Algorithm 1. Thanks to this nice
statistical property of coordinate-wise median, we can further
prove that, based on the screening rule in (3), the aggregated
vector g˜(wk) obtained from (4) has linear growths of the
r-th moments, r = 2, 3, 4. We formally stated this result in
the following lemma:
Lemma 2 (Linear Growth of r-th Moment): There exists
constants Ar, Br > 0, r = 2, 3, 4, such that ∀k ≥
0,E‖g˜(wk)‖r ≤ Ar + Br‖wk‖r if the step-sizes ηk, ∀k,
satisfy ηk ≤ min{hr(Ar, Br, Cr, Dr), r = 2, 3, 4}, where
the functions hr(·), r = 2, 3, 4, will be specified in the proof.
Lemma 2 indicates that, under the aggregation rule in
Algorithm 1, the obtained g˜(wk) remains satisfying the
linear growth of the r-th moment assumption (cf. Assump-
tion 6). As will be discussed next, the boundedness of
the moments implies the global confinement property of
the weight parameter vector wk, which in turn will play
an important role in establishing convergence of SGD-type
methods in non-convex optimization. We formally state the
global confinement property as follows:
Lemma 3 (Global Confinement of {wk}): Let {wk} be
the sequence of weight parameter vectors generated by Algo-
rithm 1. There exist a constant D > 0 such that the sequence
{wk} almost surely satisfies ‖wk‖ ≤ D as k →∞.
In what follows, we will characterize the Byzantine-
resilience performance of our proposed LICM-SGD ap-
proach. Toward this end, we first introduce a useful perfor-
mance metric for measuring Byzantine resilience:
Definition 2 ((α, q)-Byzantine Resilience [2]): Let α ∈
[0, pi/2] and let q ∈ [0,m] be an integer. Let w1, . . . ,wm be
i.i.d. random vectors distributed as w ∈ Rd with Ew = g,
where g ∈ Rd is deterministic. Let b1,b2, . . . ,bq ∈ Rd
be any random vectors possibly dependent on {wi}. An
aggregation rule G is said to be (α, q)-Byzantine resilient,
if for any 1 ≤ i1 < ... < iq ≤ m, the aggregated vector
G(w1, . . . , b1︸︷︷︸
i1
, . . . , bq︸︷︷︸
iq
, . . . ,wm)
satisfies: i) 〈EG,g〉 ≥ (1 − sinα)‖g‖2 > 0, and ii) for
r = 2, 3, 4, E‖G‖r is bounded by a linear combination of
terms E‖w‖ri , i = 1, . . . , n− 1, with r1 + ...+ rn−1 = r.
Geometrically speaking, Condition i) in Definition 2
means that, with q Byzantine attackers, the average of
stochastic aggregation outcome of G(·) is contained in an
error ball centered at the end point of g, such that the
angle between EG and g is bounded by α. Condition ii)
is a technical condition that is useful in our subsequent
convergence analysis. With Lemmas 1–2, and Definition 2,
we are now in a position to characterize the Byzantine-
resilience of our proposed LICM-SGD method as follows:
Theorem 1 (Byzantine Resilience): Under Assump-
tions 1–6, if i) the number of Byzantine worker q
satisfies 2q + 1 < m (i.e., less than one half) and ii)
(3 + 2γ + )
√
dσk < ||∇F (wk)||, ∀k, where  > 0 can
be arbitrarily small, then Algorithm 1 is (α, q)−Byzantine
resilient, where α ∈ [0, pi/2] is defined by
sinα = sup
∀k
{
(3 + 2γ + )
√
dσk
‖∇F (wk)‖
}
,
where σk denotes the deviation in iteration k.
Based on the Byzantine resilience result in Theorem 1, we
establish the convergence of LICM-SGD as follows:
Theorem 2 (Almost Sure Convergence of LICM-SGD):
Under Assumptions 1–6, the sequence of true
gradients {∇F (wk)} generated by Algorithm 1
converges almost surely to a flat region defined by{
w ∈ Rd : ‖∇F (w)‖ ≤ (3 + 2γ + )√dσk
}
, where  > 0
can be arbitrarily small.
Finally, the time-complexity of the aggregation scheme in
Algorithm 1 is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (Aggregation Time-Complexity): The aggr-
egation rule (3)–(4) in Algorithm 1 has a computational time-
complexity O(md).
The proof, experiment setup details and the attack models
are in the supplementary material.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we conduct experiments to show the
convergence and robustness of our LICM-SGD algorithm and
compare it with state-of-art Byzantine-resilient algorithms.
We use the normal averaging method without any attacks as
the ground truth baseline, denoted by “Mean (no attack).” In
addition, we compare our method with state-of-art Byzan-
tine tolerant algorithms, which can be categorized into two
classes. The first class is geometric-median-based algorithms,
including Krum [2] and Bulyan [4]. The second class is
coordinate-wise median-based algorithms, including Median
and Trimmed mean [3].
In Fig. 2, we evaluate the effects of three different attacks
on Mean method and found that even the Mean method
can tolerance small fraction of Gaussian and Label Flipping
attacks. 1 From Fig. 2 and prior results [2], [6], it can be
seen that the Omniscient Attacks model is much stronger
than the other two. Thus, in the rest of the experiments, we
only show the results of Omniscient Attacks.
Results: 1) Resilience to Byzantine attacks: In Fig. 3, we
test MLR task on MNIST with a small fraction of attackers
q = 8,m = 40. Not surprisingly, all Byzantine-resilient
algorithms can reach reasonable accuracy. Our LICM-SGD
algorithm has the same accuracy as Bulyan, outperforming
others. In Fig. 4, we illustrate the CNN results for MNIST
with q = 18,m = 40, which is the maximum defendable
number of attackers (2q + 1 < m). All other methods fail
completely with accuracy of less than 30%. Our LICM-SGD
algorithm achieves 85% accuracy, only slightly lower than
the ground truth baseline. Here we do not compare with
Bulyan since it requires 4q + 3 < m, hence at most 1/4
being Byzantine asymptotically. Hence, Bulyan cannot be
directly compared to LICM-SGD, which allows up to 1/2
of workers being Byzantine. We can obtain similar results
on dataset CIFAR-10 for both MLR and CNN tasks under a
small and large number of Byzantine attackers in Figs. 5
and 6. We note that in all experiments, the performance
of Krum [2] is not stable and its performance could vary
significantly with different data samples. In Figs. 3–6, Krum
performs worse than other methods. But we do find in other
examples that Krum’s performance could be comparable to
other methods, which is consistent with the observations
in [4], [7]. In contrast, the performance of LICM-SGD is
insensitive to the changes in data samples.
2) Cost of Byzantine attacks: Next, we evaluate the
sensitivity of our LICM-SGD to the number of Byzantine
attackers. Fig. 7 illustrates the results of MLR with Om-
niscient Attacks on MNIST. We can see that the presence
of Byzantine attacks only has a small impact on accuracy.
The accuracy drops from 87.5% to 83.2% with the attackers’
number ascendant from 0 to 18, which shows that our LICM-
SGD algorithm is insensitive to the number of Byzantine
attackers. Also, LICM-SGD is a more practical algorithm
than other methods since it does not require any prior
100 200 300 400 500
Iteration
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Mean(8/40 Gaussian Attack) Mean(no attack)
Mean(8/40 Labelflip Attack)
Mean(8/40 Omniscient Attack)
Fig. 2. MLR with different Byzantine attacks on
MNIST, q = 8,m = 40.
100 200 300 400 500
Iteration
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ac
cu
ra
cy Median (8/40)
Mean (no attack)
Krum
Mean (8/40)
Trim (8/40)
LICM-SGD (8/40)
Bulyan (8/40)
Fig. 3. MLR with Omniscient Attacks on
MNIST, q = 8,m = 40.
200 400 600 800 1000
Iteration
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Trim(18/40)
Median(18/40)
LICM-SGD(18/40)
Mean(no attack)
Mean(18/40)
Krum(18/40)
Fig. 4. CNN with Omniscient Attacks on
MNIST, q = 18,m = 40.
200 400 600 800 1000
Iteration
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Mean(no attack)
Krum(8/40)
Median(8/40)
LICM-SGD(8/40)
Bulyan(8/40)
Trim(8/40)Mean(8/40)
Fig. 5. CNN with Omniscient Attacks on CIFAR-
10, q = 8,m = 40.
100 200 300 400 500
Iteration
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Ac
cu
ra
cy
Mean(no attack)
LICM-SGD(18/40)
Mean(18/40)
Median(18/40)
Trim(18/40)
Krum(18/40)
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Fig. 7. MLR with Omniscient Attacks on MNIST
for LICM-SGD, q = 0, 8, 12, 18,m = 40.
information about the number of attackers. The number
of attackers can vary greatly in practice, which could be
problematic for other methods. Note that the value of γ does
not change in the experiment of each dataset, no matter how
q changes. In other words, γ depends only on the dataset,
but not the number of attackers. Note that these performances
are achieved with an optimal time-complexity O(md), i.e.,
same as the baseline mean method with no attacks.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new Lipschitz-inspired
coordinate-wise stochastic gradient descent method (LICM-
SGD). Our LICM-SGD method can resist up to one half
of the workers being Byzantine, while still achieving the
same convergence performance compared to the no-attack
scenario. Note that our LICM-SGD algorithm does not
require knowledge of the number of Byzantine workers.
Thus, it is more practical compared to existing works in the
literature. Also, our proposed LICM-SGD approach enjoys
a low O(md) computational time-complexity, which is the
same as the basic distributed SGD algorithm and significantly
lower than the O(m2d) time-complexity of existing methods.
We have also conducted extensive numerical studies to verify
the performance of our LICM-SGD method. Our numerical
results showed that the classification accuracy under LICM-
SGD is near that of the standard distributed SGD method
with no attacks (at most 5% lower), and consistently per-
forms better than existing works. Our results in this work
contribute to the increasingly important field of Byzantine-
resilient distributed learning.
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VII. SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
A. Experimental Setup
Experimental Setup: We consider training multi-class
logistic regression (MLR) and convolutional neural network
(CNN) classifiers based on the MNIST and CIFAR-10
datasets. We trained a simple convolutinoal nerral network
with two convolutional layers (size 3×3×16), each followed
by max-pooling layer with 2×2, and a fully connected layer.
ReLu activation was used for all layers and the output layer
has 10 units with softmax activation. The batch size is 32 and
64 for MLR and CNN classifiers on MNIST, respectively.
The batch size is 128 for both MLR and CNN classifiers
on CIFAR-10. γ is set to 10 in all classify tasks. In each
experiment, 40 workers are launched to form the distributed
learning process. The number of Byzantine attackers are set
to 0, 8, 12, and 18, respectively.
Byzantine Attack Models: We consider three popular
Byzantine attack models in this paper, namely, Gaussian
Attacks, Label Flipping Attacks, and Omniscient Attacks.
1) Gaussian Attacks: Byzantine attackers draw fake gradients
from a Gaussian distribution with mean zero and isotropic
covariance matrix with standard deviation 200 to replace the
true gradient estimations.
2) Label Flipping Attacks: Byzantine attackers do not require
any knowledge of the training data distribution. In our
experiment, we generate label flipping attacks as follows:
On each Byzantine machine, we replace every training label
l with 9− l, e.g, 2 is replaced with 7, etc.
3) Omniscient Attacks: Byzantine attackers know all the
benign gradients of the total m workers. Then, they replace
the benign gradients with the opposite value multiplied by
an arbitrarily large factor.
B. Proofs of the Main Results
In this subsection, we provide detailed proofs for all
theoretical results stated in Section IV-B.
Proof of Lemma 1. If the number of Byzantine workers
q satisfies 2q + 1 < m, then there must at least exist two
non-Byzantine workers p and q, such that
[gp(wk)]j ≤ [uk]j ≤ [gq(wk)]j .
Since p and q are non-Byzantine, we have that gp(wk) and
gq(wk) satisfy the assumptions of bounded variance and
linear growth of r-th moment (cf. Assumption 2 and 6).
Hence, it follows that E‖[uk]j − [∇F (wk)]j‖2 ≤ σ2, and
E‖uk‖r ≤ Cr + Dr‖wk‖r,∀wk ∈ Rd, r = 2, 3, 4. This
completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. We prove Lemma 2 by induction.
Let Ar and Br, r = 2, 3, 4, be some constants such that
Ar > Cr and Br > Dr, respectively. In the base case,
g˜(w0) = u0, which is the coordinate-wise median of all
stochastic gradients in the first iteration. As long as the
Byzantine attackers are less than half of the total workers,
Lemma 1 guarantees that E‖g˜(w0)‖r ≤ Cr + Dr‖w0‖r ≤
Ar +Br‖w0‖r, r = 2, 3, 4.
Now, assume that in iteration k, we have E‖g˜(wk)‖r ≤
Ar + Br‖wk‖r holding true, we want to show that
E‖g˜(wk+1)‖r ≤ Ar + Br‖wk+1‖r continues to hold in
iteration k + 1. Toward this end, note that
‖g˜(wk+1)‖ =
∥∥∥ 1|T ∗k |∑i∈T ∗k gi(wk+1)∥∥∥
(a)
≤
∥∥∥ 1|T ∗k |∑i∈T ∗k gi(wk+1)−uk∥∥∥+‖uk−uk+1‖+‖uk+1‖
(b)
≤ (1 + γ)‖uk+1 − uk‖+ ‖uk+1‖
where (a) follows from the triangle inequality and (b) is
due to the selection process in Step 4 in Algorithm 1. It then
follows that, for r = 2, 3, 4, we have:
‖g˜(wk+1)‖r ≤ Aˆr‖uk+1 − uk‖r + Bˆr‖uk+1‖r, (7)
where Aˆr and Bˆr are constants that depend on r. For
example, if r = 2, then after expanding (7) and collecting
terms, we have Aˆr = 2(1+γ)2 and Bˆr = 2. The derivations
for r = 3, 4 follow similar processes but are more tedious,
and so we omit the details here for brevity. From (7), we
further have that:
E‖g˜(wk+1)‖r ≤ Aˆr E‖uk+1 − uk‖r︸ ︷︷ ︸
(P1)
+Bˆr E‖uk+1‖r︸ ︷︷ ︸
(P2)
, (8)
For r=2, to bound (P1) in (8), we have from Lemma 1 that:
E‖uk+1 − uk‖2 ≤ 2E‖uk+1‖2 + 2E‖uk‖2
≤ 2(C2 +D2‖wk+1‖2) + 2(C2 +D2‖wk‖2)
= 4C2 + 2D2‖wk+1‖2 + 2D2‖wk‖2. (9)
Recall that wk+1 = wk − ηkg˜(wk), which implies that
‖wk‖ ≤ ‖wk+1‖+ ηk‖g˜(wk)‖. It then follows that:
‖wk‖2 ≤ 2‖wk+1‖2 + 2η2k‖g˜(wk)‖2
≤ 2‖wk+1‖2 + 2η2k(A2 +B2‖wk‖2). (10)
After rearranging (10), we have
(1− 2B2η2k)‖wk‖2 ≤ 2‖wk+1‖2 + 2A2η2k
We assume 1 − 2B2η2k > 0, i.e. ηk < 12B2 . For notational
convenience, we let R(2)1 , 12B2 . Then, we have:
‖wk‖2 ≤ 2
(1− 2B2η2k)
‖wk+1‖2 + 2A2η
2
k
(1− 2B2η2k)
. (11)
Plugging (11) into (9) yields:
E‖uk+1 − uk‖2 ≤ 4C2 + 2D2‖wk+1‖2 + 2D2‖wk‖2
=
(
4C2+
4A2D2η
2
k
1−2B2η2k
)
+
(
2D2+
4D2
1−2B2η2t
)
‖wk+1‖2.(12)
Using Lemma 1, we have:
E‖uk+1‖2 ≤ C2 +D2‖wk+1‖2 (13)
Combining (12) and (13), we obtain:
E‖g˜(wk+1)‖2 ≤ A′2 +B′2‖wk+1‖2,
where constants A′2 and B
′
2 are defined as:
A′2 , 2(1 + γ)2(4C2 +
4A2D2η
2
k
1− 2B2η2k
) + 2C2,
B′2 , 2(1 + γ)2(4D2 +
4D2
1− 2B2η2k
) + 2D2.
To guarantee A′2 ≤ A2 and B′2 ≤ B2, it suffices to have:
η2k ≤
4A2 − [8(1 + γ)2 + 2]C2
4A2D2 − 2B2C2[8(1 + γ)2 + 2] + 2A2B2 , R
(2)
2
η2k ≤
B2 − 2[6(1 + γ)2 − 1]D2
2B22 − 8B2D2[(1 + γ)2]− 4B2D2
, R(2)3
Letting h2(A2, B2, C2, D2), [min(R(2)1 , R
(2)
2 , R
(2)
3 )]
1
2 com-
pletes the proof for r = 2. For r = 3, 4, the proofs follow
similar processes and we omit them in here for brevity.
Proof of Lemma 3. With Lemma 2 and Assumption 6, the
global confinement of {wk} follows from [12, Sections 5.1–
5.2] and [9, Lemma 2].
Proof of Theorem 1. To show that LICM-SGD is (α, q)–
Byzantine resilient, we first verify Condition i) in Defini-
tion 2, i.e. 〈Eg˜(wk),∇F (wk)〉 ≥ (1 − sinα)‖∇F (wk)‖2.
Note that
‖g˜(wk+1)−∇F (wk+1)‖
(a)
≤ ‖g˜(wk+1)−uk‖+ ‖uk+1−uk‖
+ ‖uk+1 −∇F (wk+1)‖
(b)
≤ (1 + γ)‖uk+1 − uk‖+ ‖uk+1 −∇F (wk+1)‖,
where (a) follows from the triangle inequality and (b) is due
to the selection process in Step 4 in Algorithm 1. Following
the same token, we have
‖uk+1 − uk‖ ≤ ‖uk+1 −∇F (wk+1)‖+
‖uk −∇F (wk)‖+ ‖∇F (wk+1)−∇F (wk)‖,
which implies:
E‖uk+1−uk‖ ≤ E‖uk+1−∇F (wk+1)‖+E‖uk−∇F (wk)‖
+ E‖∇F (wk+1)−∇F (wk)‖
(a)
≤ 2
√
dσ + LηkE‖g˜(wk)‖,
where (a) follows from Lemma 1, Assumption 2 and the
update in (5). It then follows that
E‖g˜(wk+1)−∇F (wk+1)‖ ≤ (3 + 2γ)
√
dσ
+ (1 + γ)LηkEg˜(wk).
By Lemma 3, wk is global confined. Hence, all continuous
functions of wk are bounded, including ‖wk‖2, Eg˜(wk), and
all derivatives of the cost function F (wk).
Since limk→∞ ηk = 0, for any  > 0, there exists a
k, such that ∀k ≥ k, (1 + γ)LηkEg˜(wk) ≤ E(uk −
∇F (wk)) ≤ 
√
dσk. Hence,
E‖g˜(wk+1)−∇F (wk+1)‖ ≤ (3 + 2γ + )
√
dσk.
Thus, if ‖∇F (wk+1)‖ > ‖g˜(wk+1)−∇F (wk+1)‖, we
have
sinα = sup
∀k
{ (3 + 2γ + )√dσk
‖∇F (wk)‖
}
.
This completes the proof of verifying Condition i).
Next, we verify Condition ii), i.e., the r-th moment of
g˜(w) is bounded by a linear growth with respect to ‖w‖r,
r = 2, 3, 4. Note that this is exactly what has been proved in
Lemma 2, which implies that Condition ii) is satisfied. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of Theorem 2 follows a
similar framework to that used in [12] to prove stochastic
approximation without attacks. We show that, using our
aggregation rule in Algorithm 1, the same convergence result
can still be obtained under Byzantine attacks. Let Pk denote
the σ–algebra (i.e., the information available) available up
to iteration k. Applying the first-order Taylor expansion on
F (·) and using the update step (5), we have:
F (wk+1)−F (wk)≤−2ηk〈g˜(wk),∇F (wk)〉+η2kg˜2(wk)K1,
where K1 is a constant that upper bounds the second
derivative (cf. Assumption 5). Then, we have
E[F (wk+1)−F (wk)|Pk]
(a)
≤ −2ηk(1−sinα)(∇F (wk))2
+ η2kE[g˜2(wk)]K1
(b)
≤ η2kK2K1, (14)
where (a) is due to g˜(wk) is (α, q)−Byzantine resilient and
(b) follows from the global confinement of wk. Let δk(x) =
1 if x > 0 or 0 otherwise. Then, taking expectation on both
sides of (14) yields E[δk(F (wk+1) − F (wk))] ≤ η2kK2K1.
Note that the right-hand side is a convergent infinite sum due
to step-sizes Assumption 4. By quasi-martingale convergence
theorem [12], the sequence F (wk) converges almost surely,
i.e. F (wk)
a.s.−−→ F∞. Summing (14) over k = 1, 2, ...,∞,
the convergence of F (wk) implies that:
∞∑
k=1
ηk(∇F (wk))2 <∞ a.s. (15)
Now define gˆk = ‖∇F (wk)‖2, following the same process,
we can obtain: E[δk(gˆk+1 − gˆk)] = E[δkE[gˆ(wk+1) −
gˆ(wk)|Pk]] ≤ ηk(∇F (wk))2 + η2kK2K3. The two terms on
right-hand side are summands of convergent infinite sums
by Assumption 4. Again, by quasi-martingale convergence
theorem, we have gˆk
a.s.−−→ 0,∇F (wk) a.s.−−→ 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. To obtain the median of an m-
sized array, the average time complexity is O(m). Repeating
this process d times in our aggregation rule yields a time-
complexity O(md). Plus, the time-complexity of comparing
the median and each returned gradient O(md). Thus, the
total time-complexity is O(md).
